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Abstract  
In highlighting the 'strong state' features of the classical developmental 
state (DS), civil society's role for the realisation of developmental 
outcomes is often under-represented if not entirely side-lined in the DS 
literature in Africa. Given the renewed interest in the rising notion of 
democratic developmental states (DDS), civil society as an integral part 
of democracy must have some significance for aspirational 
developmental trajectory in Africa, and especially in South Africa.  This 
article presents an analysis of the role of civil society in the project of a 
South African developmental state. A trend assessment is conducted with 
the view to illuminate where the civil society organisation (CSO) stands, 
and in the pursuit of the developmental state in South Africa's young 
democracy. The study identifies a number of strengths as well as 
challenges currently facing CSOs in South Africa with regard to their 
contribution towards the realisation of the democratic developmental 
state. 
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Introduction
In the developmental state(DS) literature, the importance of civil 
society is, to some extent, side-lined as emphasis is given to the 
economic achievement and living standards occasioned by the 
interventionist programs of a 'strong state'. A DS tends to derive its 
legitimacy from this narrow (mis)conception of its success as 
linked to its authoritarian features(Wade, 1990; Leftwich, 2008). 
Although Evans (1995) highlights the importance of a 'co-
operativist' dimension with regard to state-society relations, his 
position is essentially anchored in state-business relations. The 
aspect of civic engagement seems to be considered of less 
importance. However, as the idea of the democratic 
developmental state [DDS] gains pulse in the 21st century, the 
attitude is increasingly being questioned; the centrality of civil 
society organisation to democracy is being underscored. 
Increasingly, development advisors, governments and organs of 
civil society in African countries view the DS as the best means for 
Africa to resolve its numerous developmental challenges 
(Maphunye, 2009: 29; Mkandawire, 2001; Mkandawire, 2010). 
The debate as to whether the DS model can thrive in a democracy 
has remained polemic, and with implications for democracies in 
Africa that aspire towards building developmental states. What 
model is to be adopted: autocratic or democratic? 
A Review of the Literature
Although, scholars are divided over the feasibility ofDDS evenin 
Africa, the attainability of sustainable development that addresses 
the numerous socio-economic and political challengeson the 
continent makes this aspiration almost indispensable for each 
country(Asuelimeet al., 2014; Lekane and Asuelime, 
2017).Edigheji (2005: 5-6)Rightly explains that Africa's quest for 
democracy is hardly merely driven by the need to rid itself of the 
repressiveness of autocracy, but also the strong belief that 
democracy wi l l  ensure  improved socio-economic 
conditions(Odunayoet al, 2017). Democracy and development are 
mutually reinforcing and thus, must go hand in hand in delivering 
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socio-economic justice to the people. Hence, the act of making 
choice in democracy is possible after citizens "have overcome 
poverty, squalor or ignorance, as these constitute constraints on 
freedom and equality"(Edigheji, 2005: 5). As such, what matters in 
the developmental state is hardly so much about the despotic 
power than the 'infrastructural power' defined as the state's 
capacity "to actually penetrate and to implement logistically 
political decisions throughout the realm"(Evans cited in Edigheji, 
2010: 18).
In  pos t -Apar the id  South  Afr ica ,  e ffor t s  towards  
developmenthavebeen couched in the DS language in some 
government policy pronouncements, however politicized. To the 
degree that lessons drawn from some Asian developmental states 
such as Malaysia have figured in South African policies, it is not 
entirely misplaced to think of South Africa as, at least, an 
aspirational DS. The transformative potential of the National 
Developmental Plan, Vision 2030, supports this view since it 
clearly reveals efforts to make the DS objectives work.Hitherto, a 
number of developmental policies, such as the Reconstruction and 
Development programs(RDP)and the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution plans (GEAR) have to some extent advanced this 
aspiration, however limited, post-1994. Depending on the 
yardstickof assessment, scholars have maintained varying 
positions in this regard. Some modestly consider South Africa as a 
DS, while others disagree(Edigheji, 2010; Fine, 2010; Bond, 
2008). 
When juxtaposed with classical Asian DS, South Africa is largely 
seen, by critics, to have fallen below the mark in terms of the 
concord between the theory and practice of DS. This view is based 
on the argument that regardless of its theoretical imports, the 
notion of DS is primarily anchored in practical experience 
especially as demonstrated in number of Asian economies in the 
20th century(Routley, 2012).In this regard, the development 
indices do not favour South Africa. Hence, Bond (2007:9) was not 
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hesitant to disregard a South African DS as "an oft-abused phrase 
to mean… a combination of macroeconomicneo-liberalism and 
unsustainable megaproject development, dressed upwith rather 
tokenistic social welfare policy and rhetorical support for a more 
coherentindustrial policy".In the same vein, an appreciable 
number of scholars have rightly questioned the practical reflection 
of this model in South Africa relative to the classical Asian DS, 
especially  in terms of economic growth and development 
(Gumede, 2009; Hofmeyr, 2012; Charities Aid Foundation 
Southern Africa, 2012; Leibbrandt et al., 2010). While 
ascertaining the validity of this view is beyond the scope of this 
study, it is salient not to beentirely overlooked even in the case of 
South Africa.  
Nevertheless, it is also well appreciated that the conditions in the 
classical DS might have altered; hence DS in this era may have to 
be different from what was obtained in the classical DS(Woo-
Cumings, 1999; Edigheji, 2005). One critical difference in this 
regard is the democratic as opposed to the autocratic nature of 
those classical DSs.It is now commonplace to hear about DDS, 
and rightly so, even in the case of South Africa post-
apartheid.Albeitsome aspects  of democracy arguably tend to 
limit certain capacities of the state towards attaining a 
'developmental state' status,a viable democracy remains integral 
to development, broadly understood as freedom and capability 
(Sen, 1999; Routley, 2012). Moreover, asBurger (2014: 5) rightly 
observed,  "given the high price paid to attain democracy, it is 
unlikely that South Africans will accept the containment of their 
civil liberties in the interest of economic growth" as was 
predominantly the case in East Asian developmental states. Thus 
it is quintessential fortheSouth Africandevelopmental state to 
balance developmentalism, interventionism and democracy (Van 
Dijk and Croucamp, 2007).
Against this backdrop, the role of civil society in democratic 
developmental states can hardly be understated. By definition,a 
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functional state involves an effective synergy between the 
government, the business and the civil society sector.While 
insulation from special interests is considered by 'institutionalists' 
such as Seddon and Belton-Jones as necessary for a swift and 
effective response to changing economic conditions, the capacity 
to adequately identify and even implement appropriate policies in 
this regard requires the maintenance of strategic relations with 
wider civil society (Edigheli, 2007: 22).Hence, it is pertinent to 
ask: how have civil society organisations (CSOs) contributed to 
the DDS aspiration of South Africa?  Given the one-dominant-
party system of government, it is important to explore the 
relationship between the civil society and the state, and the 
implications thereof for the DDS aspiration. Hence, this study 
assesses the dynamics of civil society's contribution to the DDS 
aspiration of South Africa. We explore the past and the 
trajectories with the view to suggest further (re)direction based on 
lessons learnt from other DS state models. Accordingly, 
understanding what constitutes civil society is deemed as a 
pertinent point of departure for this study.
Civil Society Organisations
Civil society has been defined in various ways, both in broad and 
narrow terms. Commonly, civil society, also referred to as the 
third sector, is believed to comprise "social groups and 
institutions located outside of government and not working 
purely for profit in the private sector; political groups; NGOs and 
community and neighbourhood organizations; and other groups, 
which advance public interest" (Ahmad, 2008: 16). Saras 
Jagwanth's civil society includes all organisations and 
associations outside of the state  including NGOs, cultural, 
political, social and religious groupings both formal and 
informal, as well as labour unions(Jagwanth, 2003: 7). Setting the 
civil society distinctly apart from both the market and the state, 
Habib and Kotze (2002:3)define civil society as the "organized 
expression of various interests and values operating in the 
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triangular space between the family, state, and the market". Their 
justification is based on Jean Cohen's and Andrew Arato's 
emphasis on the normative and open-ended outlook of civil 
society as opposed the instrumental and strategic outlook of 
political and economic actors. Habib and Kotze's definition is 
endorsed as a working definition for this study in view of this 
distinction. Civil societyisdistinguished from "both a political 
society of parties, political organizations, and political publics (in 
particular, parliaments) and an economy society composed of 
organizations of production and distribution, usually firms 
cooperatives, (and) partnerships(Cohen and Arato, 1992: 
ix).Essential to these definitions is the independence of state that 
characterises civil society; and which is sometimes an essential 
determining factor of the effectiveness of CSOs. 
Relevance of Civil Society broadly construed
The 2012 World Economic Forum rightly identified the wide-
ranging roles of CSOs under the following major 
divisions:watchdogs, advocates, experts, capacity builders, 
incubators, representatives, citizenship champions, solidarity 
supports, and definer of standards. As such, functional CSOs are 
considered important agents of democratisation and have been 
evolving in impactful and dynamic ways(World Economic 
Forum, 2013).The role of CSOs are prevailingly linked with the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and development 
(National Development Agency, 2008). Thus, CSOs "are 
imperative as a space for the building of identity in a world where 
citizens feel that they have little control over their circumstances 
and where the nation state becomes too big for its citizens and too 
small in relation to the global world order" (Charities Aid 
Foundation Southern Africa, 2012). Equally, it has been observed 
that the level of economic development and the development of 
CSOs are correlated. "At the individual or national level, higher 
income and higher education levels both correlate with increased 
participation in (for individuals) or numbers of (for states) civil 
society organizations" (Pekkanen, 2004: 374). Hence, healthy 
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CSOs actively facilitate citizenry participation in public life, 
enabling them to advance and/or defend their interests(Charities 
Aid Foundation Southern Africa, 2012: 20). Similarly, Castells 
aptly observed the important role of CSOs in addressing citizens' 
vulnerability, especially in terms of their loss of identity, to 
increasing global order relative to their smallness (Castells cited in 
National Development Agency, 2008)
(Democratic) Developmental State and Civil Society
The importance of CSOs in the overall realisation of human-
centred development has gained ascendency in DDS literature 
especially in recent times. Thus, the notion of "restricted … access 
to the state by organised groups in civil society" considered as 
integral to DS (Öni?, 1991: 119),  now hardly represents the 
developmental state in the modern era.  In fact, it is believed that a 
weak and subordinated civil society cannot give a truly democratic 
developmental state (DDS)(Maphunye, 2009: 47). Even in the 
case of East Asian DSs, the importance of civil society is traceable 
despite the autocracy. The hyperactive student movement in Korea 
which aided in checking the abuse of bureaucratic and government 
power is a case in point (Öni?, 1991: 115)."In spite of the inherent 
weakness of civil society in the East Asian context, certain 
elements within civil society have nevertheless contributed to the 
process of increased accountability"(Öni?, 1991: 115). 
Accordingly, civil society's participation in the governance 
process is as important as the other features of DSS, such as 
remarkable economic growth, a state-led developmental agenda, 
and ethical civil service administrations, among others 
(Maphunye, 2009: 45-46). Participation in this sense refers to the 
relationship between various interest groups and the 
governmentaimed, directly or indirectly,at influencing the 
developmental trajectory of the state (Roodt, 2001: 470).  
South Africa's aspiration to build a developmental state shaped by 
the history and socio-economic dynamics of South African society, 
acknowledges the importance of participatory democracy in 
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addressing its many socio-economic changes. This is evident in its 
idea of a developmental state. According to the ANC policy 
document (2007: np), the DS model'South by South Africa' is one 
that will:
"guide national economic development and mobilise 
domestic and foreign capital and other social partners to 
achieve this goal. It will have attributes that include: 
capacity to intervene in the economy in the interest of 
higher rates of growth and sustainable development; 
effecting sustainable programmes that address challenges 
of unemployment, poverty and underdevelopment with 
requisite emphasis on vulnerable groups; and mobilising 
the people as a whole, especially the poor, to act as their 
own liberators through participatory and representative 
democracy.However, the attainability of these highly 
desirable goals within the DDS paradigm, no doubt, calls 
for enormous efforts and inter-agency cooperation. One 
particular agency that has contributed globally and 
continues to influence societal development, even in the 
classical developmental states, is the civil society. In 
Japan's developmental story, the salience of civil society 
is evident especially in term of their contribution to social 
movements. For instance, with reference to Japan, 
Pekkanen asserts that a "quiescent civil society sector (the 
organized non-state, non-profit sector) characterized the 
developmental state and was as central to the 
bureaucracy's political insulation as the distance from 
politicians" (Pekkanen, 2004: 363). 
According to the Edigheji (2005)four important principles 
characterise a DDS namely: electoral democracy; popular 
participation in the development and governance processes; 
economic growth; and state-driven socio-economic development. 
Clearly, the salience of civil society participation in the 
development and governance processes is acknowledged here. 
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Civil society is integral to the consolidation of democracy.  Yet 
among the scholars that acknowledge the salience of civil 
society in the developmental state, only a fewshow how civil 
society can work well with a state's policy intervention.By 
definition in DS literature, the notion of state generally 
excludes the business sector, civil society and political society 
(Routley, 2012: 6; Okoliko, 2014). A DS thus is inherently 
supposed to be characterised by"restricted and preferential 
access to the state by organized groups in civil society" (Öni?, 
1991: 119). To this effect, the notionof insulated bureaucracy, 
deemed a strong feature of the Asian DS model, is often 
sometimes overstressed (Leftwich (1995: 405); Öni?, 1991: 
119).
But as Maphunye (2009: 8) rightly observed, this overemphasis 
on insulated bureaucracyundermines "the relationship between 
citizen participation in policy-making (especially development 
planning) and policy formulation: such an insulated 
bureaucracy would ultimately be autonomous from popular 
preference and even political intervention".Advocatesof the 
21st century DSS immediately acknowledge that a vibrant civil 
society is a sine qua nonof development and that African DS 
must take this path instead of the Asian model increasingly 
considered unsuitable for Africa (Evans, 2010; Maphunye, 
2009: 13). Thus, Evans (2010:49) noted that the 21st century 
DS will need to be a capability-enhancing state. The states 
would then be about building relevant links with civil society 
actors in order to ensure consensus aimed at providing 
collective goods such as education and health.
The three major institutions of a state namely: the government, 
the economy (or business), and civil society are without doubt 
inter-connected and interdependent in a healthy society. This 
relationship and the quality of their performance is likened to 
organs in a body or species of fauna and flora in an eco-system 
(Inyathelo Annual Report, 2012: 15).Therefore, the task of 
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"aiding and assisting the building of a society to enable citizens to 
live in a society where basic needs are met" almost automatically 
makes a cooperative rather an adversarial approach of a CSO to 
the state a necessity(National Development Agency, 2008: 
19).The foregoing is indicative of fact that "non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), labour leaders, faith based  organizations, 
religious leaders and other civil society representatives play a 
critical and diverse set of roles in societal development" (World 
Economic Forum, 2013: 3). 
Civil-State Relation in South Africa
CSOs have been very instrumental in the history of South Africa, 
especially during the struggle and the transition to democracy. 
They influenced, and were also influenced by, South Africa's 
political and economic history, especially under apartheid.Their 
nature, character and scope were largely determined by these 
circumstances.Under apartheid, CSOs were "either serving white 
interests or aligned to the state, or in opposition to the 
state"(National Development Agency, 2008: 3). For instance, 
during the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
talks and in the Multi-Party negotiating forum, civil societies 
partnered with the ANC to assist in developing policy positions 
and in determining priorities for the state (Jagwanth, 2003: 
9).Itsuffices to acknowledge that a major challenge for the success 
of CSOs at the time was their "disparate, uncoordinated, locally 
focused and untidy margins, expressed in the proliferation of 
multiple terrains of struggles spread geographically and 
thematically all over the country(National Development Agency, 
2008: 15). In post-apartheid era therefore, these various interests 
have been largely harmonised on the dictates of democratic rules, 
thereby reducing the sectionalism that characterised the civil 
society services in the past. The very content of the Constitution 
with many of its provisions, including the socio-economic rights 
and the establishment of state institutions supporting 
constitutional democracy, are all indicative of the strong influence 
of civil society'sinput (Jagwanth, 2003: 9). Meanwhile, the 
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successes of the contribution of theanti-apartheid CSOs in the 
struggle largely reflect their independence from the state at the 
time. Civil societywas closely aligned with the ANC, which 
championed theliberation struggle at the time. Since the ANC has 
taken over government,the previous mutually beneficial 
relationship between civil society and the ANC hasbecome 
increasingly conflicted. One of the reasons is that CSOs, given 
their varied purposes, have worked towards maintaining an 
independent identity(Charities Aid Foundation Southern Africa, 
2012).
Roles and Importance in South Africa
The contribution of CSOs in South Africa ranges from skills, 
passion, experience to heart and energy - all of which make up the 
immune system of the society (Inyathelo Annual Report, 2012).  
The range of issues that CSOs address in South Africa include 
among others: working conditions, agricultural productivity, 
environmental degradation and urban services, which strongly 
reflect the fundamental and civil rights of the populace. 
Expectedly, global trends shape CSOs, alongside the national 
context: such that their formation is coloured by class, race, and 
ethnicity in tune with the times. Under apartheid, their focus was 
largely advocacy-based, aiming at the toppling of the illegitimate 
government, "fighting for the poor and improving the lives of 
South Africa's marginalized groups" (National Development 
Agency, 2008). CSOs have often been in the forefront of social 
change, such as movements on issues relating to  "access to 
housing, health care and education, basic service delivery, 
violence against women and gay and lesbian people, and 
xenophobia" among others (Inyathelo Annual Report, 2012: 18).
From their charity role, CSOs in South Africa, especially the non-
profit organisations (NPOs)  have grown in their delivery capacity 
and in their representation of public interest, either pressurising 
the state or delivering services to parts of society that others 
cannot reach.CSOs in South Africa serve the developmental 
function of providing basic socio-economic services, even those 
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beyond the immediate capacity of state. The statutory work of 
social workers such as in the Child Welfare organisation is a case 
in point, where CSOs are able to go beyond the immediate 
coverage of the state's or communities' social services in meeting 
the needs of the most in need in areas lacking formal organisation 
(National Development Agency, 2008: 19). In addition, CSOs 
have successfully championed collective court action against the 
state, asin the case between the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) and the Minister of Health in 2000.
The Black Sash is similarly engaged in a joint programme with 
national government to monitor service delivery at provincial 
levels.Another example is that the Department of Labour in some 
provinces aids workers in accessing information concerning their 
labour rights. Furthermore, in the recent xenophobic violence, a 
number of NGOs played critical roles in assisting victimsand 
through their campaign NGOs continue to raise consciousness 
against xenophobia. Moreover, the partnership of CSOs with the 
Department of Social Development and its provincial 
counterparts in the empowermentservices being delivered to 
victim of rape and domestic violence across the country, are a 
reminder of the importance of CSOs in South Africa. Other areas 
of NGOS role include the TAC, in monitoring the services to 
people living with HIV and AIDS. Also the Inyathelo Annual 
Report (2012: 17) notesthe "progressive civil society activism that 
holds the key to the consolidation of democracy and to ensuring 
that constitutional values and principles are advanced and 
defended".
These pivotal functions of CSOs through history are evident, for 
instance, in the "anti-slavery movements and the campaign for 
women's suffrage"(Charities Aid Foundation Southern Africa, 
2012). In the particular case of South Africa, CSOs were useful in 
the realisation of democracy, which brought the previously 
marginalised groups out of political domination. They have been 
56 VOL. 31. NO. 1. JANUARY  2016 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
instrumental in variouspost-apartheid developmental and service 
delivery projects in the ongoing efforts towards economic 
equity.The National Development Agency (NDA), for instance, 
"focuses on organisations that play a developmental or service 
delivery role as these are the organisations that the NDA is 
mandated to work with" (National Development Agency, 2008: 6). 
Steven Friedman (2002: 14) starkly asserted that CSOs have been 
becoming "delivery intermediaries between the framers of social 
policy and those for whom it is intended".Some of the prominent 
CSOs in South Africa that contributed to the entrenchment in the 
Constitution of the right to freedom of expression, include the 
Save the Press Committee, the Campaign for Open Media, and the 
Anti-Censorship Action Group, all of whom shaped the process 
leading to the reformation of the South African media and, 
ultimately ending the  repressive apartheid and  entrenching in the 
constitution ofthe right to freedom of expression(Commission, 
2006: 154). "Civil society organisations have been very effective 
at exposing businesses that exploit child labour, or are guilty of 
unfair labour practice, or environmental degradation, or price-
fixing and excessive profit-making"(Inyathelo Annual Report, 
2012: 7). Some of the developmental work of CSOs is linked with 
human empowerment and community actions, including bringing 
about "a change in the way marginalised people regard themselves 
so that low self- esteem and resignation do not block people's 
initiatives to improve their situations"(Camay and Gordon 
2004:12). This also helps people to become agents of change in 
their community (Sebugwawo, 2015). The Soweto Electricity 
Crisis Committee (SECC), the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) 
and the Concerned Citizens Group (CCG) are some examples of 
CSOs which have played pivotal roles in safeguarding the interest 
of the poor in the post-1994 context. Theyhave campaigned 
against evictions, electricity cut-offs and the government's 
privatisation policies(Commission, 2006; Habib, 2005)."Besides 
the increasingly important role of civil society organisations in 
delivering relief and welfare, contributing to a range of sectors 
from the environment to education, they have a political role 
through their advocacy function" (cited in Inyathelo Annual 
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Report, 2012: 6).
Civil Society - State Relations in South Africa
It is noted however that the relationship between CSOs and the 
ANC-led government has not always been rosy. "The ANC has for 
some time objected to civil society organisations with the critique 
that nobody has voted for these organisations, and that they are 
therefore unaccountable" according to theInyathelo Annual Report 
(2012:7). 
collaborative relationship/s (sometimes adversarial) between the 
state and the various organisationshave been either withcorporatist 
institutions or allies such as the Tri-Party alliance between the 
ANC, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and 
the South African Communist Party (SACP)(Ballard et al., 2005; 
Habib, 2005). Corporatist institutions such as the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), civil 
society and the business sector have experienced some collegiate 
relationship with the state and thus are ableto discuss matters 
concerning the functioning of the state and hopefully influence the 
policy processes of the state(Ballard et al., 2006: 397). Meanwhile, 
it is somewhat of a struggle for CSOs to negotiate the necessary 
balance between being both a partner and a watchdog concurrently, 
especially because of their dependence on government for funding 
and support. 
In post-apartheid era however, CSOs are presented witha paradox 
in which "government supports civil society, particularly those 
involved in service delivery; and at the same time becomes 
increasingly wary of civil society, particularly of social movement 
type organisations that critique the government" (National 
Development Agency, 2008: 18). To adequately hold the state 
accountable and helps towards the consolidation of democratic 
development, CSOs require a meaningful independence from the 
government.
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Essence of Civil Society inDemocratic Developmental State
As argued elsewhere, "developmentalism entails the promotion of 
human-centered development and not just economic growth"; that 
is, developmentalism necessarily encompasses the whole issue of 
"economic freedom, social freedom, political freedom and 
environmental sustainability"(Edigheji, 2010: 10).Beyond socio-
economic services, government has the duty of ensuring justice, 
community participation in shaping society and the effective 
functioning of democratic systems, which means that South Africa 
cannot be said to be democratic developmental state without these. 
This heavy load in the context of South Africa's nascent 
democracy is extremely difficult for the government to carry 
alone. Immediately, theroles of the third sector, the CSO, in the 
overall development of a state, are easily discernible from this 
perspective.
The question of lack of capacity, of skills (of government 
employees) and of the will to drive the developmental state agenda 
are considered to be the major impasse in the realisation of its 
developmental aspiration. Red tape and dysfunctional 
institutionshamper good and effective governance so that, despite 
the massive allocation of funding for government and 
development institutions, outcomes remain less than what is 
desired.According to Von Holdt (2010:4) there is a lack of "'well-
organised and effective routines, as well as analytical, 
discretionary and innovative capacity". Noyoo (2005: 27) 
suggests that "for partnerships between government and CSOs to 
develop and thrive, it is necessary to institute specific channels 
and mechanisms to facilitate constructive dialogue on 
programmes and policies". He maintains that concrete 
opportunities must be created to facilitatethe programs of CSOs to 
ensurethe meaningful participation of the populace in government 
programs. 
Challenges
In spite of their importance, CSOs in South Africa face a number 
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of challenges. As in other parts of the world, various factors from 
many national governments pose serious challenges to the 
vibrancy of civil society in terms of freedom and access. For 
instance, besides the sometimes cumbersome registration process 
in certain states, "international civil society leaders have identified 
a more general decline in funding available for advocacy, rights-
based activities, orcauses that challenge the status quo" (World 
Economic Forum, 2013 :7).
From within civil society itself, issues of accountability and 
transparency delimits the capacity of CSOs to effectively deliver 
on their mandates. Political repression of civil society and labour 
movements in South Africa is considered as one other challenge 
affecting the  institutionalising of the DDS ideals (Kuye and Ajam, 
2012).Increasingly, NGOs do not always find their work easy. One 
of the critical challenges facing CSO post-1994 include the 
decline in both internal and external financial support relatives to 
what was obtained in the 80s when donor support of CSOs was 
high with the view to facilitate the realisation of democracy. 
Subsequently, donor attention shifted towards the new 
government, due to the partnership and various international 
agreements of the new South African government with these 
donors' home government. The need to protect their economic and 
business interests has largely weakened the strong linkage that 
existed between international civil society organisations during 
apartheid (Hearn, 2000; Roodt, 2001; Ballard et al., 2005). The 
resultant depletion in donor support has adversely affected the 
vision and capacity of CSOs especially the developmental ones. 
While some have disappeared,"others are simply trying to adapt, 
down-scale and reposition themselves in order to survive", a 
situation aggravated by the culture of dependency (Inyathelo 
Annual Report, 2012: 14). The folding up of the Development 
Resources Centre (DRC) and more recently Institute for 
Democratic alternative in South Africa (IDASA),due to funding 
issues, mirrors the shrinking of CSOs over the last 20 years. To 
compound the issues, government tend sometimes to be wary of 
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advocacy groups. The government approach to the e-tolling 
campaign is a case in point.  Understandably, government would 
hardly support a group against itself. 
Moreover, the attitude that drove civic-state relations under 
apartheid, on the one hand, and during post-apartheid on the other 
hand, is also revealing in terms of the implications for the 
effectiveness of civil society. Under apartheid,the civic-state 
relationship was clearly that of opposition to the illegitimate 
regime; it was that of antagonism which underscored the 
normative nature of civil society. The challenge of post-apartheid 
however is different. Civil society now has to play the dual and 
challenging role of being both partner and critic of the government 
at the same time. This has implicationsnot only for its poor funding 
post-apartheid but also for the depletion of human capacity which 
declined as erstwhile CSOs' intellectuals and leaders took their 
seats in government especially post-apartheid(Charities Aid 
Foundation Southern Africa, 2012).A closer observation of the 
civil society-state relationship from the early 1990s seems to 
suggest a dashingof initial hopes and expectations. The initial 
optimism,especially in the early 90s, was that,under the ANC 
government, CSOs would always find a good partnership given the 
close alliance of CSOs with the ANC during the struggle. This did 
not fully materialise and the initial honeymoon was over following 
the perception of CSOs as competitor rather than as collaborator. 
Successive governments post-apartheidhas been somewhat ill-
disposed toward civil society. The conservative view is that civil 
society interferes with government programs. This dangerous 
attitude opens space for a dictatorship as has been seen in Asia, 
Latin America and some parts of Africa. As Phiroshaw Camay 
remarked in an interview, though they have been some 
cooperation, depending on personalities by and large, the 
relationship has been conflicted (SACSISNews, 2013). 
All of these threaten the vibrancy of civil society, which in turn has 
implications including that communities' voicesare getting fainter 
in government circles. The Information Bill issue and the limited 
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number of CSOs involved relative what use to be, signals a general 
weakening of civil society's part in governance. In fact, according 
to Phiroshaw Camay, even the seeming re-emergence of civil 
society in the public sphere, especially in the case of the e-tolling 
campaign and the Limpopo textbook crises among others, needs to 
be critically interrogated. He maintained that these do not 
necessarily signal a growing civil society advocacy,considering 
the manner in which some of these cases have been handled by the 
judiciary that has largely become quite conservative in recent 
years. Pre-apartheid civil society was rightly often suspicious of 
the judiciary, an attitude that arguably contributed towards its 
vibrancy and success (SACSISNews, 2013). In his view, the 
recourse to the courts for settlement does not help the grassroots 
communities, which means that the civil society is hardly able to 
win in its battles with communities it claims to support.
Critics of South Africa'sDS have preferred the tag of welfare state 
considering the redistributive bent to a number of government 
social policies especially those geared towards addressing the long 
standing issues of inequality and poverty. However, the low 
economic growth indices in recent years have impacted negatively 
on the very capacity of government to redress these issues. Perhaps 
realising that the capacity of government to address these issues 
through the RDP was overestimated, government had to switch to 
the GEAR in 1996 (Huyse and Livni, 2010).However, the 
CSOsinvolvement in the design as well as the implementation of 
GEAR was drastically limited as though their capacity to help in 
the social development in the DS sense, were immaterial. While 
the causal link between this limited involvement of CSOs and the 
minimal success of the program may not be linear, the wider reach 
of CSOs suggests it would have had a better impact had the CSOs 
been well integrated. It is against this backdrop that Noyoo (2005: 
25)aptly suggeststhat given a somewhat obstinate stance of the 
government on GEAR, the "social investment model could be 
posited by civil society as an alternative in regard to poverty 
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reduction.  The idea is to transcend the merely redistributive 
consumption-based social warfare centered on benefits and rights" 
to one that substantively enhances people's capacity to actively 
participate in their own development (Perkins cited in Noyoo 
2005:25). The essence is to focus on human capital 
development,and, given the wider reach of CSOs in social 
developments, it becomes an imperative for the state to 
substantively engage them if success is to be achieved. 
Recommendation and Conclusion
Compared to the autocratic DS model, South Africa's DSS should 
be  participatory, ensuring a meaningful involvement of "various 
stakeholders such as civil society organisations, community bodies 
and various other role-players … in shaping public policies" 
(Maphunye, 2009: 7).As Öni? (1991: 123) rightly suggests, the 
idea of a 'strong state' within the DS paradigm must go beyond the 
featuring of a high degree of bureaucratic autonomy and capacity; 
as the existence of a "significant degree of institutionalized 
interaction and dialogue between the state elites and autonomous 
centres of power within civil society" must be emphasised. 
Corroborating this view, Evans' work on "deliberative institutions" 
with reference to healthy civic-state relationship anchored on 
"thick democracy" accentuated the potential of  public discussion 
and interchange for improving developmental performance (cited 
in Okoliko, 2014: 158).In view of the very complex nature of 
development issues, complex solutions are required. Accordingly, 
civil society isvery much required to be entrepreneurial enough to 
build alliances that will enable them to strengthen their impact.
In South Africa, the role of "social watch" and "service delivery" 
are clearly identified with non-profit organisations (NPOs). CSOs 
should be the voice of the people against the government as most 
were anti-apartheid CSOs. Hence, with the view to realising the 
DDS goals, it is expedient for CSOs in South Africa to be much 
more involved in national discussions on pertinent policy, learning 
from the involvement of trade unions and the private sector. 
VOL. 32. NO. 1. JANUARY  2017 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
64
Emphasising the need for broader civic-government 
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c y  ( i . e .  b e y o n d  n a r r o w e d - b a s e d  
collaboration),Meintjies (2015) rightlyadvocates a more 
formidable networking and partnership through apex 
organisations that meaningfully represent the views and the spirit 
of the grass roots. In his view, hitherto, there have been "huge gaps 
partly based on dismissive attitudes in many parts of government 
and on fragmentation and the scarcity of strong networks within 
civil society.  The need for such strategic-level engagement must 
be addressed, even as attention is paid to gaps in partnership at 
local and provincial levels"(Meintjies, 2015: np).
One critical point of note is that civil society which is involved in 
development planning, implementation and evaluation helps to 
ensure a 'bottom-up' as opposed to the 'top-down'approach due 
precisely to the wider reach of CSOs compared to the state".As 
Roodt (2001: 470-474) explains, the former approach entails the 
active participation of the beneficiaries of any given development, 
through their local structures, in determining the type of 
development that most suits their needs; they may also participate 
in the implementation and running or monitoring of the 
development plans.  The latter on the other hand, pay little or no 
heed to citizens' involvement. If the democratic developmental 
state goals are to be realised, civil society must partner with 
government to come up with good policies that recognise the 
involvement of the grassroots. This is essential for the realisation 
of People centred DS.This is not only required for addressing the 
ravaging poverty and inequality but also for the overall 
consolidation of South Africa's young democracy, given its 
potential to drive appropriate public policy. Indeed "without 
appropriate public policies, economic growth can end up being 
jobless without increased employment opportunities; ruthless 
with benefits going mainly to the rich rather than the poor; 
voiceless without an expansion of empowerment and political 
engagement; rootless by stifling rather than encouraging cultural 
diversity; and futureless by depleting natural resources rather than 
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being environmentally friendly" (Spencer, 2009: 95).
In conclusion, it is a truism that South African civil society has 
played, and continues to play, a pivotal role in the developmental 
agenda of the state. However, the sustaining of their contribution 
is threatened with a host of challenges identified in this study. 
These issues which are increasingly leading to the closing of 
CSOs must be urgently addressed;and the sector needs urgent 
strengthening in order to be able to help deliver the realisation of a 
democratic developmental state, especially as embodied in the 
NDP's Vision 2030. Critically the issues of funding and capacity 
development need to be addressed in order to restore civil society 
to the level of vibrancy required to be able to make a meaningful 
contribution to Vision 2030. 
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